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CASENOTE
INTERPRETING THE CRIMINAL SENTENCING PROVISIONS OF THE CLEAN
WATER ACT: LESSENING THE GOVERNMENT'S BURDEN OF PROOF AT THE COST
OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
U.S. v. Chenetco, Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
US. v. Chemetco, Inc. involves issues arising during the sentencing of a scrap metal smelter
under the criminal provisions of the Clean Water Act 2 ("CWA-). 3 Following Chemetco's plea of
guilty to knowingly violating the CWA by polluting without an appropriate permit, the United States
4sentenced the defendant based upon a preponderance of the evidence. Chemetco appealed and, as a
result, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit became the first court to address the
issue of whether the burden of proof under Section 309 (c)(2) is governed by the evidentiary
standard of reasonable doubt, or merely upon the preponderance of the evidence. Additionally in
this case, the Seventh Circuit became the first court to decide whether the United States Supreme
Court's ruling in Apprendi applies to sentencing under the CWA.
This note will argue that while the Seventh Circuit correctly ruled that the holding of
Apprendi is inapplicable,6 the court failed to address the constitutional issues raised by the Supreme
Court, in its overview of prior case law contained in Apprendi, regarding the determination of
whether a statutory provision constitutes an element of an offense or a sentencing provision.' The
distinction is critical to this case, because an element of an offense must be proven by a reasonable
doubt, but a sentencing factor may be proven merely by the preponderance of the evidence.'
Therefore, the court's ruling sacrifices the defendant's constitutional rights in order to provide the
government with an easier way of punishing criminal violations of the CWA.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
A. Factual History
On September 12, 1986, the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency issued a permit
allowing construction and operation of a storm-water runoff control system to Chemetco, a scrap
metal smelter located in Hartford, Illinois." Contract laborers were then hired by Chemetco to install
this system.10 The laborers were instructed by Chemetco to install a secret pipe on Chemetco's
property running to a nearby ditch tributary. After finishing the installation, the exposed sections
274 F.3d 1154 (7th Cir. 2001)
33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (2001).
See Chenetco, 274 F.3d at 1158.
4Id. at 1156.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
6 Chemetco, 274 F.3d at 1161.
See generally id. at 1158-61.
s See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477-78.
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of the secret pipe were covered with straw.12 This secret pipe was not included in any blueprints or
drawings kept by Chemetco, nor did Chemetco have a permit allowing it to discharge pollutants via
this system.' Chemetco used the secret pipe to discharge water containing toxic metals, such as
lead and cadmium, until September 18, 1996, when the pipe was discovered by the United States and
the Illinois Environmental Protection Agencies.14
B. Procedural History
Chemetco, through a plea agreement, pleaded guilty to both conspiring to violate and
knowingly violating the CWA. and pleaded "nolo contendere" to making false statements to
government officials.' 5 In accordance with the plea agreement, Chemetco acknowledged
discharging pollutants via the secret pipe during at least some of the time during the ten-year period
alleged in the indictment.' 6 Chemetco also agreed that the fine recommended to the court would be
based on the number of days for which a violation had occurred.' 7 Further, both parties agreed that
Chemetco would be liable for a fine of $2,500 to $25,000 "per day of violation" before February 4,
1987,18 and for a fine of $5,000 to $50,000 "per day of violation" thereafter.' 9 Thus, the only
disputed question of fact was the number of days that a violation had occurred.20
Both parties prepared sentencing memoranda for the probation office in which they made
recommendations for fine ranges. ' The government recommended fining Chemetco for 949 days of
violation, which consisted of 948 days when it rained during the period listed in the indictment, plus
22the day when officials first witnessed the pipe discharging pollutants. Chemetco argued that there
were fewer days of violation because the pipe did not discharge pollutants on every day that it
rained, and thus there should only be seventy-one days of violation.23 To support this contention,
Chemetco s expert witness presented two alternative methodologies for calculating days of violation,
and the company presented testimony of employees stating that the secret pipe could not have
discharged pollutants on every day that it rained because on certain occasions the valve to the secret
pipe was closed.24
The probation office issued its pre-sentence report (PSR) in which it concluded that there
were 711 days of violation, yielding a fine range between $3,502,500 to $35,025,000.25 Chemetco
then filed an objection to the PSR. citing the Supreme Court's recent decision in Apprendi.26
Chemetco claimed that it had to "be charged in the indictment with each day of violation" and that
the number of days of violation had to **be proven by the government beyond a reasonable doubt."27
hl. This lower value reflects Section 309(c)(2) 2 of the CWA before the passage of the Water Quality Act of 1987, which raised the
level of fines to the current level. See Pub. L. No. 1004. § 312. 101 Stat. 7: 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (1982).






27 Chemetco, 274 F.3d at 1157 (citing Apprendi. 530 U.S. at 477).
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The district court rejected Chemetco's objection, finding that the indictment was sufficient
given that it informed Chemetco of the charges and put Chemetco on notice of the maximum
penalty.28 Further, the court held that Apprendi did not apply to this case, and therefore the number
of days of violation under the CWA was a sentencing factor that the court could find by only a
'.preponderance of the evidence. 2 At the sentencing hearing, the district court found by a
preponderance of the evidence that there were 676 days of violation, resulting in a fine range
between S3,327,500 to $33,275,000.30 Accordingly, the district court levied a $3,327,500 against
Chemetco, which Chemetco appealed.
C. Legal Arguments on Appeal
On appeal. relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Castillo v. US, 32 Chemetco
challenged the sentence ordered by the district court, arguing that Congress intended the number of
days of violation to be an element of a CWA offense rather than a sentencing factor.33 In Castillo,
the court held that -although the language of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994) was ambiguous, the
structure of the statute clarified Congress's intent to create a new element of a separate offense." 34
Chemetco argued in the alternative that Congress intended for each day of violation to be
charged as a separate offense, relying on a district court case from Pennsylvania, U.S. v. Oxford
Royal Alushrooin Prods., Inc.36 In that case the court denied a motion to dismiss an indictment
tinder the multiplicity doctrine because it concluded that whether the indictment charged the
defendants with the days of violation separately, or with a single course of conduct, made no real
difference because the CWA directs punishment for each day of violation. 37 Finally, Chemetco
argued that treating the number of violation days as a sentencing factor does not comport with the
constitutional limits as set forth in Apprendi. In that case. the court held that "other than the fact of a
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.f '
The Seventh Circuit rejected Chemetco's interpretation of Congressional intent, holding that
because the "clear and unambiguous language of Section 309(c)(2) comports with the overall
statutory scheme of the CWA.- Congress intended the number of violation days to be a sentencing
factor and not an element of a CWA offense.' The court was not persuaded by Castillo, believing it
was inapposite to this instant case.4 0* Similarly the court rejected Chemetco's assertion that Congress
intended each day of violation to be charged as a separate offense, finding that reliance on Oxford
\\as misguided. that the plain language of the CWA "*contradicts** this argument, and that the
practical results of using such a rule could not have been Congress' intent.4 1 The Seventh Circuit
also rejected Chemetco's assertion that the rules set forth in Apprendi are applicable in this case,
Id. o ,~u I1 7-58.
5303 U.S. 120 (200(0).Id.atI18
Chenwewo. 274 F 3d at 1159 (citing Casillo. 530 t.S. at 124-25).Chemeco. 274 F.3d at 1160.
487 F. Supp. 852 (E D. Pa. 1980).
Id- at 856.
Cheneico, 274 F.3d at 1160 (citing Casillo. 530 U.S. at 490).
Chenwwo. 274 F.3d at 1159.
Id.i at ! 159-60).
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because the CWA does not have a prescribed statutory maximum penalty:4 2 Thus, the Seventh
Circuit affirmed Chemetco's sentence.4 3
III. LEGAL. BACKGROUND
Section 301 of the CWA provides that it is unlawful for any person to discharge a pollutant
unless in compliance with the provisions of this Act.4 4 One can achieve such compliance by
obtaining a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit from the United States
Environmental Protection Agency, or from a qualified state agency.4 5 Section 309(c)(2) establishes
criminal penalties for "knowing" violations of Section 301 of the CWA. stating: [a]ny person who
. . knowingly violates Section 301 ... shall be punished by a fine of not less than S5,000 nor more
that $50,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more that 3 years. or by both.-4 6
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that, within certain constitutional limits,
Congress can identify which factors are elements of a crime, and which are sentencing factors.
One such constitutional limit is the right to due process.48 The Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause requires that the government prove each *,element'^ of an offense -beyond a reasonable
doubt." 49 The historical foundation for this principle extends down centuries into the common law.
"The demand for a higher degree of persuasion in criminal cases has been recurrently expressed
from ancient times, [though] its crystallization into the formula "beyond a reasonable doubt' seems
to have occurred as late as 1798."51 It is now accepted in common law jurisdictions as the measure
of persuasion required of the prosecution."2 The United States Supreme Court has explained the
reliance on this standard, stating that it -reflects a profound judgment about the way in which law
should be enforced and justice administered." 3 This practice also holds true when indictments are
issued pursuant to statute. 4
"Any possible distinction between an 'element* of a felony offense and a *sentencing factor'
was unknown to the practice of criminal indictment, trial by jury, and judgment by court as it existed
during the years surrounding our Nation's founding"" -[T]he English trial judge of the later
eighteenth century had very little explicit discretion in sentencing. "56 The judge was simply to
impose the sentence as proscribed by the appropriate substantive law.: Thus. ""the judgment. though
pronounced or awarded by the judges, [was] not their determination of or sentence, but the
determination and sentence of the law." 8 However. "[b]oth before and since the American colonies
became a nation, courts in this country and in England have practiced a policy under which a
sentencing judge could exercise wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used for
42 Id. at 1160.
4 Id. at 1161.
" 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2001).
45 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2001).
46 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (2001).
47 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 485-490.
' See generally id.
4 Id. at 477; see also U.S. v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506(1995);Sulliran r Louisia,,a 508 US 275. 278 (1993)
' Appendi, 530 U.S. at 477.
" Id. at 478.
52 Id.; see also C. McCormick. Evidence § 321. pp.681-682 (1954): 9 J. Wigmore. Evidence § 2497 (3d ed. 1940).
5"Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968).
5 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 480.
" Id. at 478.
6Id. at 479.
" Id.
s Id. at 479-80.
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assistance in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by
law."59 Thus, "the judge's task in sentencing is to determine, 'within fixed statutory or constitutional
limits, the type and extent of punishment after the issue of guilt' has been resolved 6.- 60
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that due process extends, to some degree,
"to determinations that go not to a defendant's guilt or innocence, but simply to the length of his
sentence." 6' This "was a primary lesson" of Mullanv v. Wilbur62 , a 1975 Supreme Court case in
which the Court invalidated a statute because criminal law "is concerned not only with guilt or
innocence in the abstract, but also with the degree of criminal culpability assessed."" The Court
further reasoned that a State could not circumvent the protections afforded by the Due Process
Clause merely by "characterizing [elements] as factors that bear solely on the extent of
punishment."6
It was in McMillan v. Pennsylvania0 5 that the United States Supreme Court first coined the
term "sentencing factor" to refer to a fact that was not found by a jury. but that could affect the
sentence imposed by the judge. In that case, the Court upheld the validity of a statute because the
statute did not run afoul of the Court's previous admonitions against relieving the State of its burden
of proving guilt, or tailoring the mere form of the statute solely to avoid concerns of infringement of
the defendant's constitutional right to due process. 6 However, the Court did not budge from its
position that (1) constitutional limits exist to States' authority to define away facts necessary to
constitute a criminal offense,6 7 and (2) that a state scheme that keeps from the jury facts that
"expos[e] [defendants] to greater or additional punishment' may raise serious constitutional
concem.6 8
In Alnendarez-Torres v. US., the Supreme Court created an exception to this historical
practice by allowing a judge to increase punishment if the defendant had a prior conviction, based
only on a preponderance of the evidence. The Court reasoned that the certainty that procedural
safeguards attached to any fact of prior conviction mitigated the due process and Sixth Amendment
concerns otherwise implicated in allowing a judge to determine a fact increasing punishment beyond
the maximum of the statutory range.6 9 However, the Court made clear in Jones v. U.S., 7 that
Almendarez-Torres "represents at best an exceptional departure from the historical practice that we
have described."7'
In 2000, the Supreme Court revisited this issue in Apprendi v. New Jersey.72 The Court
reexamined their previous cases in this area, and confirmed the validity of their opinion stated in
Jones.7 3 The Court held that, "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
5 Id. at 481 (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949)).
6 Id. at 482 (citing Williams, 337 U.S. at 247).
61 Id. at 484 (citing Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 251).
62 Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
6 Id. at 697-698.
6 Id. at 698.
65 McMillan V. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986)
" Id. at 86-88.
67 Id. at 85-88.
68 Id. at 88.
69 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488.
70
oJones v. US., 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
7' Id. at 248-49.
72 Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466.
" Id. at 490.
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proved beyond a reasonable doubt.", 4 The Court also stated that the relevant inquiry, in deciding
whether a statutory provision represents an element of an offense or a sentencing factor, "is not one
of form, but of effect-does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than
that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict.75 The Court further explained that "merely because the
state legislature place[s] ... [the] sentence enhancer within the sentencing provisions of [the statute],
does not mean . . . it is not an essential element of an offense."76 Thus the Court concluded that "the
mere presence of this enhancement in a sentencing statute does not define its character."77
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In order to determine whether Congress intended the number of violation days to be a -
sentencing factor or an element of a crime, the Seventh Circuit first looked at the language of the
78
statute. The court found that the "per day of violation" language of Section 309(c)(2) "qualifies
the term of punishment." thus the number of days that the violation occurred is a "factor to be
determined after a "violation" has been established." Therefore, the court concluded that the plain
meaning of the language of the statute "expresses Congress's unambiguous intent."80
The Seventh Circuit then began its analysis of the language in context of the overall scheme
of the CWA, stating that because the language of Section 309(c)(2) is unambiguous, it must give
effect to it if doing so is "consistent with the overall statutory scheme of the CWA."8' The court
found the CWA's statutory scheme to be clear; with Section 301 and other sections defining what
constitutes a violation, and Section 309 establishing penalties for these violations. 82 Thus,
-[b]ecause the clear and unambiguous language of Section 309(c)(2) comports with the overall
statutory scheme of the CWA." the court held that "Congress intended the number of violation days
to be a sentencing factor and not an element of a CWA offense."83 The court distinguished Castillo
from the facts in the present case, because unlike the language and structure of the statute in question
in Castillo. "the CWA's language is unambiguous and Section 309(c)(2) is an integral part of the
CWA's penalty structure."*84
Similarly. the Court rejected Chemetco's assertion that Congress intended for each day of
violation to be charged as a separate CWA offense.85 The court found Chemetco's reliance on
Oxford to be "misguided." as it concluding that Oxford only shows that the indictment in this case
"could have charged Chemetco for each individual day of violation without being defective, not that
it had to charge individual days separately."87 Further, the court concluded that the plain language of
the CWA allowing fines per day of violation implies that violations may span more than one day.88





Chem oo. 274 F 3d at I 15S.





kd at 1159-6 1.
s Id. at 1160.
s Id. at 1160.
88 Id.
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Chemetco would be subject to a prison term of 2,028 years, which the court believed was not likely
to be the result intended by Congress.8 9
The Seventh Circuit found Apprendi to be inapplicable to this case because the CWA does
not have a prescribed maximum penalty.o Even though the sentence imposed under Section
309(c)(2) of the CWA depends upon a factual finding, the court concluded that that "finding cannot
increase the amount of the fine over a prescribed statutory limit."9 Thus, the court found it proper
for the district court to -find the number of violation days by a preponderance of the evidence."92
Chemetco argued that the CWA does have a statutory maximum penalty of $50,000 per day of
violation. However, the court, acknowledging this argument to be true, did not find that the limit
was exceeded in this case, as the fine imposed by the district court, $3,327,500, was less than the
upper limit of $3,425,000 recommended by Chemetco in its sentencing memoranda.93 Further, the
court held that Chemetco's argument would not mandate a reversal because of an Apprendi violation
because that only occurs when the imposed sentence exceeds the prescribed statutory maximum.94
Therefore, the court affirmed Chemetco's sentence.9 5
V. COMMENT
'The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal
procedure.-"" "-The standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence-that
bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose enforcement lies at the foundation...of our
criminal law 1. 7' It was on this principle that our criminal justice system was founded shortly after
the creation of our democratic nation." "This notion-basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts
of a free society-is a requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in the historic, procedural
content of due process.
Thus, our legal system realizes that there is a necessary requirement of removing any factual
voids in criminal cases. Because within every criminal verdict there is a chance of deprivation of an
individual's right. upon which this country was founded. we as members of this society need
reassurance that those rights provided by the Constitution will not be taken away due to an error in
fact-finding. The reasonable doubt standard -is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of.. .factual
error.- 10 Given that there is a margin or error in every litigation that both parties must take into
account, where one party has at stake an -interest of transcending value." as does a criminal -
defendant, this margin is reduced by placing a higher burden of persuasion upon the prosecution.01
Thus, the importance of requiring a high degree of persuasion in criminal proceedings as a
foundation in our criminal justice system is evident. The Supreme Court has stated that these
principles and concerns of due process relating to guilt and innocence also extend to determinations
Id.
Idat 11,I1 (citing uS v Behrnan. 235 F.3d 1049. 1054 (7th ('ir. 2000).
Chentrco. 274 F.3d at 1161.
Id.
\le01ilan. 477 U.S. at 97.
Id (quoting Collin v. United States. 156 U.S. 432. 453 (1895)).
Ipprendi. 530 U.S. at 477.




MELPR, Vol. 10, No. I
that simply go to the length of the defendant's sentence. 102 Further, the Supreme Court has stated
that "[i]t would demean the importance of the reasonable doubt standard-indeed, it Would demean
the Constitution itself-if the substance of the standard could be avoided by nothing more than a
legislative declaration that prohibited conduct is not an 'element' of a crime. "
In this case, the Seventh Circuit failed to consider these principles in its interpretation of
Section 309(c)(2) of the CWA. The court reasoned that because the language was unambiguous and
comported with the CWA's overall statutory scheme. Congress must have intended the number of
violation days to be a sentencing factor rather than an element of a CWA offense. The court further
supported its conclusion by relying on the fact that Section 309(c)(2) was an integral part of the
CWA's penalty structure. However, this reasoning conflicts with the principles set forth by the
Supreme Court in its line of cases dealing with the issue of deciding whether a statutory provision is
a sentencing factor or an element of an offense.
A crime includes "every fact that is by law a basis for imposing or increasing punishment.
"One need only look to the kind. degree. or range of punishment to which the prosecution is by law
entitled for a given set of facts. Each fact necessary for that entitlement is an element.7')
"Conversely, where a fact was not the basis for punishment. that fact was. for that reason. not an
element."' 06 Because Section 309(c)(2) states that the applicable fine will be based upon the
number of days of violation, it is inconceivable that this language should not be interpreted as stating
an element of an offense. If the prosecution were unable to prove at least one day of violation, there
would be no basis for imposing any punishment whatsoever. There is no reason why this logic
should not apply to those days beyond the initial day of violation. Also. the Seventh Circuit's
reliance on the fact that Section 309(c)(2) is an integral part of the CWA's penalty structure is
misguided, as the Supreme Court has expressly stated that this is in no way dispositive.
Further, the Seventh Circuit's result makes little practical sense. A defendant risks being
fined $5,000 to $50,000 per day that for each day that the Court determines a violation occurred. A
lower standard of required proof increases the risk that the defendant will be subject to extreme
amounts of punishment based on a factual error. In this case Chemetco alleged that there were only
71 days of violation, while the government alleged that there were 949 days of violation. Thus there
was a disagreement between the parties of 878 days, which could result in a variance in the range of
the fine assessed of $42,400,00.
It is impossible to doubt that the legislature has concerns about the ability of the governiment
to produce evidence pertaining to days of violation. Also, the need to protect the environment
supports the contention of providing the EPA with a workable means of holding polluters liable, in
hopes of deterring similar behavior. However, it seems incredulous to believe that these concerns
merit such an invasion into an individual's Constitutional rights. An interpretation of Section
309(c)(2) that determines the "per day of violation" language to be an element of a CWA offense
provides the government with a reasonable means of punishing polluters, while maintaining an
individual's Constitutional rights.
The applicability of Apprendi to this case merits little discussion, as it is obvious that the
CWA has no maximum penalty because the penalty imposed is dependant on the number of days of
violation. However, the ramification of this decision could result in marked discussion for years to
come. Understandably, the Seventh Circuit had little to guide its interpretation, as there were no
102 A limendarez- Torres, 523 U S. at 251. -
'0 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 102 (Stevens, J., dissent).
10 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 501.
05 Id.
'6 Id. at 504.
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precedents in the area of environmental law, and the legislative history of the CWA is silent as to
this issue. However, the court did have guidance in the principles set forth in multiple cases decided
by the Supreme Court pertaining to this issue. In a case such as this, the need for a complete
discussion of all relevant concerns is undeniably great, as there is an excessive amount of ambiguity
surrounding the issue in question. That need becomes even greater when the issue in question
involves Constitutional concerns.
VI. CONCLUSION
Even if we believe that the Seventh Circuit arrived at the correct conclusion, the precedent
which it has set for dealing with this type of issue could have disparate effects on other areas of
environmental law, as well as criminal law in general. The court's failure to apply the principles set
for by the Supreme Court, for dealing with distinguishing between sentencing factors and elements
of an offense, does more than simply ignore existing precedent on the issue. It risks creating a new
standard of statutory interpretation that could result in a break-down of the fundamental principles
on which our criminal justice system was created, and continues to exist today.
DAVID A. BROSE
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